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ABSTRACT
This essay proposes to rethink Romanticism through the concept of
bliss. I suggest not only that bliss is a core Romantic concept but
also, more speculatively, that Romanticism as both a project and
tendency is generated out of an antagonistic entanglement
between bliss and the world of Western modernity. As the state
of immediate fulfillment, free of alienation or negativity, bliss is
what modernity at once promises and endlessly defers—and so
bliss erupts in Romanticism against the modern world. In bliss,
the world is dissolved as in water, consumed as in fire, so that
nothing remains except the ecstasy of the world’s annihilation or
termination. Romanticism seeks to inhabit the utopia of bliss
immanently; however, the world re-mediates bliss into a long-lost
past or an unreachable future, because it is through this re-
mediation that the world reproduces and justifies itself. As a
result, Romanticism falls into endless approximation, into
nostalgia and longing—and bliss becomes infinitely not-yet,
fragmented, defused by the world. This essay moves through
German and British Romanticism so as to collect the scattered
fragments of bliss, and to re-assemble Romantic bliss in its a-
worldly immanence, its post-Copernican cosmic infinity, and its
(often violent) clash with the world.
The world is too much with us. (Wordsworth)
The scenes are familiar. A solitary poet, removed from “the fever of the world” yet one
with the radical immanence of all life: “the bliss of solitude” (Wordsworth 133, 304). A
wanderer atop the mountain, high above the world, looking at the endless expanse of
clouds below that merges, on the horizon, with the sky: a vast, atemporal oneness of
heaven and earth. A young heart welcoming the first delight of love “with a romantic
expectation that it will expand into bliss” (Radcliffe 21). A bliss of love found, in
which two are as one, “only in and with” the other (Schelling,Werke 15: 123), consumed
in the fire of love—“what is the world to them?” (Thomson 33)—or in which all nature is
one in love, and the power of “love, now a universal birth,” spreads immediately, also
akin to fire, “from heart to heart,” “from earth to man, from man to earth” (Wordsworth
55), collapsing all divisions of the world. A thinker, her eyes turned to heaven, in a little
boat amidst the watery calm in which all relation to the world and all worldly care feel
forever dissolved—“rien faire comme une bête, lying on water and looking peacefully
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at the sky” (Adorno 157).1 Or the utopic epoch of absolute identity, “heaven regained,”
and eternal peace—without the negativity of alienation, domination, or striving: a
kingdom of God realized (Schelling, Werke 12: 470). All of these are scenes of bliss.
Few words sound more immediately Romantic than “bliss” and yet, despite the preva-
lence of images of bliss and terms such as bliss, blissfulness, or blessedness in Romantic
literature, the immanent logic of bliss in Romanticism remains unexplored. In this
essay, I want to suggest that not only is there a common thread of bliss running
through German and British Romanticism, but also that bliss is a core Romantic
concept which can serve to reveal the stakes of Romanticism vis-à-vis the world of
Western modernity. My speculative proposition is the following. Romanticism as
project and as tendency is generated out of an antagonistic entanglement between bliss
and the modern world. The same holds for many of the familiar Romantic logics: Roman-
tic love and solitude, restlessness and calm, endless longing and apocalyptic utopianism,
acosmism and (natural, human, cosmic) unity. In other words, my suggestion is twofold:
first, there is a constitutive tension between bliss and the modern world—bliss constitutes
something like the repressed underside of modernity, on which modernity feeds yet
which, in the same stroke, it forecloses; second, among its other possible meanings,
“Romanticism” names a site where this tension comes to the fore and bliss is affirmed
as such, in all of its antagonism towards the world.
The essence of this antagonism, this clash between bliss and the world, may be axio-
matically described as follows. The modern world is infinitely negative, diremptive, and
exhausting. It demands endless work towards an endlessly deferred telos. It promises
fulfillment and non-alienation in the future while using this very promise to foreclose
them in the now, to reproduce the way things are, and to bind the subject in its self-asser-
tion to the imperatives of possession and production. Instead of overcoming alienation
and negativity, modernity ends up intensifying them: the burden of the world become
unbearable.2 By contrast, bliss indexes a state of undivided immanence free of possession
or mastery, an immediate fulfillment without any need or want, without otherness or
telos. In bliss, all negativity and alienation, all imperatives of work and striving are dis-
solved into an ante-original state of absolute oneness, indifference, and nonrelation. Bliss
is nonmediational and nonproductive, atemporal and utopic. Time stops in bliss, the
world vanishes, and the soul is “suspended… in Rapture’s blissful Trance” (Coleridge
16: 15). Bliss collapses the categorial structure of the world’s articulation and equals an
absolute freedom from the world, in which all binaries that serve to constitute the
world are immediately revealed as null and void—including the binaries of subject and
object, self and other, being and nothingness, life and death, day and night. Bliss is apoc-
alyptic: it dissolves the world as in water, consumes it as in fire, so that nothing remains
except the ecstasy of the world’s “annihilation” or “termination.”3 It engenders the
Gnostic imperative: the world must not be. In this manner, the overwhelming negativity
of the modern world generates the ultimate negation: the refusal, even annihilation of
this world itself, demanded right now. Bliss is what modernity at once promises and end-
lessly defers—and so bliss erupts in Romanticism against the modern world.
What the world promises yet forecloses comes back to haunt it, and Romanticism is a
site of this haunting, emerging at modernity’s post-Enlightenment, post-Revolutionary
moment of crisis and self-reflection. The illusory and the real reach here a point of indis-
tinction (is it bliss that is illusory? or is it the world?), sometimes peaceful, often violent.
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However, I want to suggest, it is also where bliss in a certain sense fails, becoming
infinitely not-yet and endlessly approximated, evaporating into a nostalgia for a lost
past or a longing for an unreachable future, becoming fragmented, defused, and re-
mediated by the world. This failure is instructive, because it is through the failure of
Romanticism that the modern world survives. In what follows, I move through
German and British Romanticism so as to collect and re-assemble some of the fragments
of bliss, scattered in its encounter with the world.
1. Ecstatic immanence
Beside a sea that could not cease to smile;
On tranquil land, beneath a sky of bliss… . (Wordsworth)
For understanding Romantic bliss, it is crucial that, in German and British Romanticism,
Seligkeit and bliss, respectively, form one conceptual nexus with beatitude, blessedness,
and salvation. There is, of course, an entire tradition behind this nexus. Importantly
for us, Schelling in 1795 does not hesitate to use Seligkeit at once as “bliss,” as “salvation”
(the theological meaning of the German word), and as a translation for Spinoza’s beati-
tudo.4 Earlier, the same nexus can be found in Kant. Luther’s Bible also renders “Blessed
are…” (beati/makarioi) as “Selig sind…” In English, a similar nexus formed around
bliss through its association with bless, and through what Oxford English Dictionary
calls “the gradual tendency to withdraw bliss from earthly ‘blitheness’ to the beatitude
of the blessed in heaven.” Bliss and Seligkeit thus map onto each other rather accurately.
Generally, two intertwined trajectories underlie modern thinking of bliss: the “pagan”
philosophical one, informed particularly by Stoicism and Epicureanism, where bliss is
associated with the highest state of the soul, without relation to the inconstancy of the
world (yet not otherworldly); and the Christian trajectory of bliss as otherworldly salva-
tion or mystical oneness with God in which the world is annihilated. Romanticism’s
“secularization thesis” may be said to consist in affirming bliss as salvation from and
annihilation of the world, and as not of the world, without thinking of it as otherworldly.
It may be tempting to classify “bliss” in Romanticism under the rubrics of “happiness”
or “pleasure.” However, bliss is neither. It is an ontological state that is as “moral” as it is
“religious,” refusing, like many other Romantic conceptualities, to fit neatly into the
secular/religious binary. The ontological here precedes the affective, and it is only
from the ontological that the affective can be grasped. As Coleridge writes, whereas “plea-
sure” is related to the senses, “bliss” or “beatitude” pertains to our “moral being,” even if
pleasure may be the effect of bliss (Collected Works [hereafter CW] 11: 599)—as in
Wordsworth’s “bliss of solitude,” filling one’s “heart with pleasure” (304). Bliss is a
moral state because it is divine and virtuous—the state of the soul’s highest perfection.
Happiness, too, should be distinguished from bliss. It is, says Coleridge in his Notebooks,
“that which haps, which is our Hap—a congruous disposition of the Contingencies rela-
tive to our well-being” (3: 4422). Happiness is what happens to us, or the way the world
happens to stand in agreement with our soul. It is “the Soul’s self-finding as modified by
and in harmony with her Relatives and Circumstants” (4: 5197). As such, happiness is
relative and contingent. It is always in the world, standing under the influence of
worldly circumstances. By contrast, bliss, grouped by Coleridge with “blessedness,”
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beatitudo, and makariotes, is a state of lived “holiness,” free of being affected by contin-
gent circumstances or goals (3: 4422). It is “the Soul’s self-finding in its own state,”
without being “modified” by anything accidental (4: 5197). In bliss as the “intuitive
beholding of truth in its eternal and immutable source” (CW 4: 104–05), the soul is
without relation to the world yet one with the divine truth.
In the above, Coleridge likely builds on Schelling’s ideas of bliss and intellectual intui-
tion. Coleridge’s play on “happiness” and “hap” adapts into English the distinction from
Schelling’s 1795 Philosophical Letters. In Schelling’s German, the wordplay serves to sep-
arate happiness (Glückseligkeit) from bliss (Seligkeit). The concept of Glückseligkeit,
Schelling says, contains the component of Glück (lucky chance) as something that
happens to us: “we owe our happiness not to ourselves, but to lucky chance” (Werke
3: 92). As Schelling writes in another 1795 text, Of the I, happiness consists in the “agree-
ment of objects with our I,” “of the not-I with the I” (Werke 2: 124). Bliss, however, is free
from chance, and absolutely free from (the influence of) the world. “Where there is absol-
ute freedom,” goes Schelling’s formula, “there is absolute bliss, and vice versa” (3: 94). Bliss
is a state of holiness in which the world is completely suspended and the soul immanently
refuses any relation to an outside, beholding instead the one absolute being: “intuiting the
eternal in us” (3: 87). In bliss, the eternal in us coincides with the eternal in nature and in
God, indexing the one undivided being in which there is, properly speaking, no I opposed
to the not-I, no self opposed to an alienated other or to an objective reality against which
the I would assert itself.
In a way, both German and British Romanticism may be said to begin with visions of
bliss—in the 1795 Schelling, but also in Coleridge, even before what is known to be Schel-
ling’s comprehensive influence on him. Three of Coleridge’s earliest poems, written in
1787, are already structured around the theme of bliss. Thus, “Easter Holidays” begins
with a celebration of the rebirth of nature during Easter through “the power of love,” in
which the dancing “youths” are joined by all of nature—beasts, birds, the river, and the
echo from the hills. This bliss is, however, oblivious to the “woe, / Which all mankind
are born to know,” or to the fall from innocence that awaits them in the world. The
poem ends with a celebration, too—of a bliss regained through virtue, no longer a
“thoughtless” childlike bliss but “a heav’n born content,” an indifference to the intricacies
of the world. In a state of utter nonrelation, “without respect to any tide,” the virtuous
person “His hours away in bliss shall glide, / Like Easter all the year” (CW 16: 9–10).
These final verses present an image of perfect serenity (“gliding” on the surface of time
as onwater inwhich theworld is dissolved) and eternal spring, the soul’s paradise restored.
The poem expands bliss into a scene of an absolute oneness of the heavenly, the natural,
and the human, which all immediately coincide in the now of immanent resurrection—
Schelling’s “heaven regained.” The negativity of the world appears as a tear in the imma-
nently atemporal bliss, an “exile from bliss” (an image guiding another of Coleridge’s 1787
poems, “Dura Navis” [16: 6]), a pulling-apart of the one undivided being, due to which
bliss is re-mediated into a childhood bliss and a future bliss to be (re)gained.
Wordsworth’s “LinesWritten at a Small Distance fromMyHouse”may be said to pick
up on the images of eternal spring and universal resurrection, with love as rebirth
binding everything in an immediate unity: “Love… / From heart to heart is stealing, /
From earth to man, from man to earth.” The verb “steal” may suggest here a spreading
of love that is silent or invisible (to the world), “stealing” the selfhood or self-possession
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of things—so that, suddenly, all seeming independence of worldly selfhood is consumed
by love. “It is the first mild day of March” and “there is a blessing in the air,” begins the
poem—culminating in a scene of the “year to come” spent like this, without negativity or
toil, in passivity and “idleness,” one with “the blessed power that rolls / About, below,
above,” in a being that is absolutely one, possessed by no one in particular. Within
this being, the poetic speaker’s “sense of joy” coincides with that of his companions,
their souls, like all of nature, “tuned to love.” This bliss is, again, atemporal: a now
that exceeds any rationally calculable measure of worldly time (“One moment now
may give us more / Than fifty years of reason”) (54–55). There is here no appropriation,
no use, no work of production or synthesis. The Prelude calls this bliss the “one life”
(403), a being that is ante-originally undivided and unenclosed—Home at Grasmere’s
“unappropriated bliss” (176).
In this blissful now, the particular coincides with the universal immediately, without
the negativity of synthesis but also without foreclosing the being of the particular.
Immediate coincidence of the particular with the universal is precisely how Schelling
characterizes bliss (Werke 12: 133). In the early 1800s especially, he seeks to re-
vision all being as bliss—a utopic standpoint to which the soul is immediately trans-
ported in intellectual intuition. To intuit this bliss is to see each finite being as free
of negativity or striving: to see the it is what it is at the heart of everything, an A =
A, in which the finite being’s particularity is dissolved in the pure “=.” The first
thing we intuit in any A = A, Schelling claims, is not the “A” (the particular what)
but the “=,” “the identity itself” or the pure “is” (10: 119)—a bliss that cannot be cap-
tured by the Hegelian dialectic of mediation and otherness. In bliss, everything simply
is, without any further determination. In this way, A = A and B = B dissolve equally into
the pure “=,” so that A’s and B’s particularity vanishes. This “absolute identity” or
“absolute being” cuts through all divisions and enclosures of the particular, collapsing
the distinctions between particular and universal, lower and higher, human and non-
human into a radical immanence common to all things.5 To intuit this being-in-
common is to see each finite being nonrelationally, without comparing it to other
beings, without viewing it as lacking or superior, or even as different or other. It is
to let everything simply be what it is: an absolute letting-be. This “absolute freedom”
is distinct from the finite freedom of self-assertion, striving, and mastery, through
which the modern world is upheld and reproduced.
What is disclosed in this letting-be is an all-oneness of bliss, not merely as a state of the
soul, but as a radical immanence prior to and below the world—the one immanence that
the world encloses, particularizes, negatively and transcendently imposes itself upon.
Borrowing a term from the later Schelling, this immanence of bliss may be called ecstatic,
since it empties out all selfhood and transports the soul to a standpoint that is prior to all
particularity and division. It may also be called utopic, since it cannot be identified with
any particular position in the world, refusing to be inscribed into the world’s spatial and
temporal topography. As such, bliss cannot be achieved through mediation and syn-
thesis, since these imply an originally divided reality to be synthesized and mediated.
Instead, bliss discloses the undivided real itself, preceding and refusing all mediation.
(“The absolute” as such, Schelling insists, “can never be mediated” [Werke 2: 109].)
This absolutely-real must be thought of as primary vis-à-vis the world, and the negativity
of the world as secondary, imposed, and fundamentally not (the) real.
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Thereby, in bliss, all being is exhibited indifferently, that is to say, without the nega-
tivity of difference, relation, or striving. An unorthodox logic of totality may be glimpsed
here: a utopic totality of all-dissolution. When love spreads “from heart to heart,” “from
earth to man, from man to earth,” the preposition to indexes at once the divisions of the
world and their immediate collapse. All being, as it were, immediately expands into bliss,
and absolute ecstasy coincides with absolute serenity within one radical immanence. The
example of love is paradigmatic here, because love ontologically exceeds and precedes the
self. For Schelling, in love, the souls coincide in the one absolute being, to the point of an
absolute dissolution of and freedom from the world. This marks love as blissfully indiffer-
ent, in two senses: as indifferent to the world, and as not based on differentiation or
rational choice. It is, writes Schelling in his novella Clara, only “this completely external
world” that “separates” the two “related souls” which are, in fact, ante-originally one,
deferring their unification through “centuries, large distances, or the intricacies of the
world” (72).6 The world cares not for love, it only cares about (its own) reproduction.
Nor does love care for the world, or for the divisions, intricacies, and not-yets on
which the existence of this finite world depends. If anything, the hypothetical scenario
in which all “related souls” immediately became one would imply a total dissolution
of the world’s distances and temporalities, and thus a complete cessation of the world.
Moreover, loving infinitely and being infinitely loved are undifferentiated in the abso-
luteness of love. Absolute bliss, says Schelling, is at once “unlimited activity”—since in it
there is no otherness, nothing that would delimit or negate it—and radical passivity or
infinite “repose” (Ruhe [Werke 3: 94]), just as in Wordsworthian bliss the one infinite
life coincides with nonproductivity and idleness. The subject is dissolved in bliss, too,
ceasing to be just that: a subject. For, if there is nothing to strive for, nothing to
negate or overcome, no positions to occupy, possessions to accumulate, or goals to
achieve, what would subjectivity even consist in? One would simply be what one is,
coinciding in this with the All. As a result, the Romantic “I” is essentially one with the
Romantic “we,” the “we” of lovers, soulmates, true companionship, and true commu-
nio—a oneness in nonrelation to the world. In bliss, twoness and oneness immediately
coincide. Become absolute, the I ceases to be an I, a transcendental subject or a subject
of self-assertion. The self is absolutely dispossessed in bliss, entkleidet (stripped bare;
3: 87), deprived (beraubt) of all property, particularity, or possession (3: 93).
In a perfectly Schellingian manner, in “Lines Written a Few Miles above Tintern
Abbey,” the bliss that suspends the world indexes simultaneously the soul’s solitude,
completeness, and oneness with the All. The “wild secluded scene” merges here with
the “more deep seclusion” arising as the mind “behold[s] these steep and lofty cliffs”
which, in turn, serve to merge together the earth and the sky (131)—what Home at Gras-
mere calls the “blended holiness of earth and sky,” “a Whole without dependence or
defect,” “perfect Contentment, Unity entire” (178). In both poems, seclusion coincides
with the radical immanence of all being. The resulting identity is a “serene and blessed
mood” that “almost suspend[s]” all corporeal motion, so that
…we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things. (132–33)
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This seeing sees not the world of objects, but the one absolute being (the “one life” or “the
life of things”), at once elevating the soul to a higher truth and merging it with the under-
side of the world, with an immanence that underlies all life: a blending-together of what is
below (“earth”) and what is above (“sky”).
There is a minimal motion to this oneness (hence Wordsworth’s “almost suspended”),
but it has a still, practically atemporal rhythm—a breathing (“the calm / Which Nature
breathes” [382]) that coincides with absolute stillness, like waves dissolving into the
infinite surface of the ocean. Consider in this regard “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud,”
which speaks of “the bliss of solitude” as transporting the soul immediately to the atem-
poral standpoint of “dancing with the daffodils” that, in turn, dance with the waves and
the breeze (303–04). In “Tintern Abbey,” this plenitude of non-separation reveals the one
life in “the light of setting suns, / And the round ocean, and the living air, / And the blue
sky, and in the mind of man”—the absolute cosmic power that “rolls through all things,”
preceding and indifferentiating them (134). Or as Wordsworth writes in The Prelude,
looking back at his experience of bliss:
…when with bliss ineffable
I felt the sentiment of Being spread
O’er all that moves, and all that seemeth still. (402)
Bliss is “ineffable” insofar as it collapses the entire structure of the world’s categorial
articulation, and the “sentiment of Being spread” indexes the infinite expanse of bliss,
which underlies and cuts through all enclosures of the world, “rolling” through and over-
flowing the world as in a universal flood, blending together the earth, the sea, and the
heavens into a pre-original, more-than-human vastness.
“Rolling” and “spreading” point here to the immediate intuiting or enactment of the
all-oneness of bliss in which infinite movement and infinite stillness immanently
coincide. This all-oneness is absolutely nonteleological and nonproductive, a nature
that immanently refuses to strive, to dialecticize itself.7 As the all-dissolving totality, as
leaving nothing to the world, as unmediated by the world, bliss seems to have the
power to suspend the world: “I seemed to feel such liberty was mine, / Such power
and joy” (174)—the power and joy that can only be found in refusing and collapsing
the divisions of the world. The bliss of all-dissolution is contrasted by Wordsworth
with the “joyless” world, negative and exhausting. This world demands that one keep
up the pace towards a goal that cannot be achieved, serving only to reproduce the
same “fretful stir / Unprofitable, and the fever of the world” (133). In bliss, all of this
is collapsed. As Schelling notes, the idea of absolute freedom is that of an “absolute
power” which “not only stands far above” the empirical world “but even annihilates
it” (Werke 2: 122). Wordsworth, too, speaks of bliss as “a termination, and a last
retreat,” of and from the world (178). The ecstatic immanence of bliss is absolutely a-
worldly, and to affirm bliss right now is to annihilate the world.
2. Foreclosure (and song) of bliss
That blisse may not abide in state of mortall men. (Edmund Spenser)
I will not go here into all the ways in which modernity forecloses bliss (which the cruel
optimism of the late-capitalist world8 continues to do to this day). Instead, I want to place
EUROPEAN ROMANTIC REVIEW 525
the immanent thinking and affirmation of bliss in Romanticism between two acts of such
foreclosure—in Kant and in Charles Darwin. The bliss of nature, Wordsworth’s “Elysian
quiet, without toil or strife” (327), is what Darwin seeks to deconstruct:
We behold the face of nature bright with gladness…we do not see, or we forget that the
birds which are idly singing round us mostly live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly
destroying life; or we forget how largely these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are
destroyed by birds and beasts of prey. (50–51)
Bliss can only be atemporal and nonreproductive, and so, in order to dismantle it,
Darwin inscribes it into the logic of reproduction, and into the reproductive divisions
between particular species and generations, with all the violence that a world of repro-
duction and the reproduction of the world entail. As if to counteract the collapse of
worldly divisions in Romantic bliss, the utopic scene of bliss is itself collapsed here,
brought forcefully back into the world—and Wordsworthian idle song, as indexing the
infinite immanence preceding and exceeding the divisions and speciations of the
world, is converted into finitude and danger, precisely into “toil and strife.”
Crucially, if nature can no longer serve as a site of bliss, and thus of antagonism to the
world, then the space of such antagonism shrinks whereas the world expands. At its most
radical, bliss is metaphysically affirmed in Romanticism as the utopic standpoint from
which to proclaim the world as imposed and unreal. The Romantics know full well
that bliss is impossible from the viewpoint of the world, or possible only momentarily
despite the world. However, that is the Romantic point: to reject the modern world’s
claim to absoluteness and to constituting the ultimate horizon of reality and possibility,
and to begin with bliss as that which is impossible yet real, that which the world excludes
and over which it has no power, the nonplace where the world’s binary logics and struc-
tures do not hold—to begin with bliss as the utopic standpoint from which the negativity
of the world does not appear as omnipresent or all-powerful, or even does not appear at
all. Darwin’s anti-Romantic operation, however, amounts to a further expansion of the
negative logic of the world, a further act of enclosure of the one common immanence
—the next step in modernity’s foreclosure of bliss. (The emergence of so-called “social
Darwinism” makes this foreclosure politically explicit.) Increasingly in modernity,
there is nowhere to escape from the world. In order to reproduce and justify itself—to
justify hope in its own infinitely approximated futurity—the modern world seeks to
re-mediate bliss, since the world is mediation and survives through catching everything
into its ever-expanding nets of negativity, relation, and the not-yet.
Not to let the subject escape the world of toil and strife also forms a central tendency of
Kant’s thinking—so that the project of Romanticism as a speculative post-Kantian ideal-
ism of bliss may be understood as an insistence on bliss in the face of its Kantian fore-
closure. In Critique of Practical Reason, Seligkeit is associated at once with the
atemporal divine self-sufficiency—“a perfect good [Wohl] that is independent from all
contingent worldly causes”—and a “blissful future” that only God can possess, a “holi-
ness” that “can never be fully attained by the creature” (25, 123). Bliss, Kant writes, is
“only reachable in an eternity” (128), and thus, from the perspective of finite being in
the world, constitutively deferred into an unreachable future. To dream of a being
without striving, right now, of bliss simply as an immediate “possession” (Besitz)—by
which Kant means here something that one simply has or is by virtue of one’s mere
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being, the Schellingian pure “=”—amounts to delusional “theosophic dreams.” The only
(rational) thing to do for a finite rational creature is to embrace this life of “ceaseless striv-
ing” (122–23). And so Kant consistently orients human being in the world towards an
endlessly approximated telos. In effect, readings of Romanticism that equate it with
endless approximation are Kantian readings which, by neglecting Romanticism’s
immediate embrace of absolute bliss and its programmatic attempt to begin with bliss
(and not with or from within the world), miss the antagonistic essence of Romanticism,
emerging as it is at the moment of modernity’s simultaneous consolidation and crisis. For
Romanticism, the modern logics of endless approximation, negativity, and finitude, are
the burning problem—a fact that the Romantics may sometimes embrace as inevitable
but that nevertheless makes them endlessly anxious, infinitely full of longing, striving
not to reproduce but to break free of the world—so that Novalis’s oft-quoted aphorism,
“We seek everywhere the unconditioned [das Unbedingte] but always find only things
[Dinge]” (Werke 227), may be said to express a vexation at the world’s foreclosure of
bliss. Born out of this foreclosure yet against it, Romanticism seeks to affirm bliss
immediately and immanently, and only falls into endless approximation because the
world forecloses bliss.
For Kant, by contrast, everything—all progress of morality and freedom—hinges
on the affirmation and reproduction of the world. Hegel will famously claim that
world-history is theodicy, that is, the justification of negativity and suffering as the
necessary path to the highest good: the development of freedom. This theodical ten-
dency stands already at the heart of Kant’s essays on world-history from the 1780s.
There is, Kant claims in “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” no regaining of
paradisal bliss from within the post-lapsarian world—and furthermore, no paradise
to be regained. Kant’s dismantling of paradise resembles proleptically Darwin’s dis-
enchantment of nature. Paradise, Kant avers, cannot be anything but a brutish
state of animality and the rule of instinct. The Fall should be understood, accord-
ingly, as the awakening of reason. Reason drove the human out of the “secure con-
dition of childcare, from out of a garden… and thrust him into the wide world,
where so many worries, troubles, and unknown ills awaited him” (29). In this
way, the development of reason and freedom begins, always proceeding through
negativity, war, and strife. As weak and mortal, the human must assert itself vis-à-
vis the hostile world, across generations—in Kant’s reproductive optimism, “to live
through [one’s] offspring, who would perhaps have it better” (28), becomes the foun-
dation of hope in the future.
Kant’s association of the world with the dual imperative of toil and reproduction is
striking. Given the negativity of the world, a longing to return to an “imagined seat of
bliss” is understandable (29). However, this is but an “empty longing.” If anything, the
mature human being must deride the very idea of “a carefree life of lazy daydreaming”
(36) with nothing to do but “rest in calm inactivity and perpetual peace and dream
and fritter away [one’s] existence” (29). And while Kant himself may imagine the
utopian future of eternal peace, not only does he constitutively defer it (“only God
knows when this would be” [35])—he argues that this state itself cannot be allowed to
be completely free of strife and danger, “so that humankind’s powers do not fall into
slumber” (12). Kant forecloses forcefully the utopia of doing nothing, urging the
subject “to put himself… patiently through the toils of life” (29), “to be content with
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providence (even though it has laid such a toilsome path for us),” and to focus on “self-
improvement” (34).
In a structural displacement of guilt, deficiency and evil must be regarded as “our
own” fault, not the world’s, which is thereby exonerated. But why not refuse the
demands of the world? Why not call the world out on its (and not “our”) evil?
Because, Kant’s theodical optimism tells us, we should have faith in a better
future, a future that the world is supposed to provide. At a point where the
cruelty of such a future becomes unbearable, however, to annihilate the world may
look like a better—indeed, the more rational—option, despite Kant’s or Hegel’s theo-
dical reductio of philosophy and rationality. Perhaps one can reconfigure Horkhei-
mer’s dictum that, behind philosophy’s affirmation of “truth an sich,” “conceals
itself the theological goal of eternal bliss, which philosophy took over as the
heiress of Christianity” (281) and which indexes “what is other than the world as
it is” (390). This would make it possible to weaken the theodical bond between phil-
osophy and world-justification, a bond that is central to modern thought from
Leibniz onwards. At its limit, this would make philosophy, not unlike poetry, into
a utopic space of world-delegitimation, instead of the world-reconstructing and
world-upholding activity that it has so often been (and that it also, even more cen-
trally, inherited from Christianity).
Thus, for Schelling, “absolute reason” equals absolute freedom and bliss, not the
modern rationality of subject-object division, appropriation, and mastery. Likewise, his
1800 System ends with a Romantic call for the dissolution of the world into an “ocean
of poetry” (Werke 9: 328). The oneness of poetry and philosophy expresses Romanti-
cism’s insistence on inhabiting bliss immanently and totally. Romantic utopia is imma-
nently unlimited; it is the vastness of all-dissolution. Romanticism sings the utopia of
bliss or speculatively thinks this song, both in its absolute (a-worldly) necessity and
the frailty and contingency of its finite expression vis-à-vis modernity’s inescapable
imposition of the world. The call of poetry, which philosophy must take up, is a
Gnostic call of bliss that does not interpellate, singing of utopic oneness and salvation
from the world. The effect of Wordsworth’s song on his friend Coleridge, upon the
latter’s reading of The Prelude, is telling:
Scarce conscious, and yet conscious of its close
I sate, my being blended in one thought
(Thought was it? or Aspiration? or Resolve?)
Absorbed, yet hanging still upon the sound—
And when I rose, I found myself in prayer. (CW 16: 819)
The song of bliss enacts a oneness without division, in which thought and one’s whole
being are absorbed, and the world is fully suspended, “hanging still.” The listener is at
once risen from this bliss—“we awaken from intellectual intuition,” Schelling writes,
“as from the state of death” (Werke 3: 94)—and remains in bliss qua immanent resurrec-
tion and salvation. It is a resolve (to be one in bliss, one with one’s friend and companion,
too) that finds its continuation in prayer, this a-worldly articulation that suspends the
articulation of the world, a stillness expressed in words that the world cannot capture,
a deliverance from the world that is neither religious nor secular. Certainly, after all,
the world must not be—such is the central Romantic resolve. This resolve, however,
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runs against the resolve of the modern world to be, to reproduce itself, to expand. In the
end, this cannot but lead to a violent clash.
3. Acosmic/A cosmic bliss
Ah! was that bliss
Feared as an alien, and too vast for man? (Coleridge)
One should not be deceived by the serenity of bliss, just as the power of the ocean is not
diminished by the serenity of its blueness. Bliss is inhuman (“alien”) and “too vast for
man,” as Coleridge writes, since the immanent vastness of bliss precedes and exceeds
the logic of human self-assertion or the modern Western definition of “man.”9 The
world, compared to this vastness, appears as but a “bubble” (CW 16: 655). Whoever per-
ceives the blended all-oneness of bliss simply as gladness fails to see the abyss it opens up,
which swallows the finite world and the finite self. Arguably, one reason why Romanti-
cism embraces nature as the site of bliss has to do with the fact that there is an immense
inhuman power in nature—its deep time and oceanic depths, its geological catastrophes
and volcanic eruptions, its post-Copernican cosmic infinity—and this power cannot be
exhausted by the modern logic of finitude. To inhabit this power immanently is to
“cease to be a finite being” (Schelling, Werke 3: 79). As one with the entire post-Coper-
nican and Anthropocenic nature, bliss cannot but be an alien bliss, and if the Romantics
are capable of sensing it to be somehow deeply familiar, then this is because they feel this
bliss to precede ontologically the negativity of the world, annulling the world’s claims to
primacy. What Schelling calls the “essence” of our soul, to which we are transported in
intellectual intuition, is immediately one with the vastness of the universe, compared to
which the world’s demands appear insignificant. Perhaps it is that vastness, and not the
world, that is our true home.
That bliss precedes this finite life of striving, is often indexed in Romanticism by the
association of bliss with childhood, and with the figure of the child (as is so often the
case in Wordsworth)—not as emblematic of the world’s reproductive futurism, but as
nonreproductive. The child is one in whom reflection and the toils of life have not yet
severed the immediate connection to the primordial vastness of bliss. Childhood is a
stage at which the human is at once less and, ontologically, infinitely more than the
mature, delimited subject of self-assertion. In a way, the child is not of the world, and
not yet in the world. That bliss cancels out this life, is indexed by the Romantic association
of bliss with death. This death, however, is not the Darwinian or Kantian death as
marking the subject’s inescapable mortality, and thus part of the finite world’s reproduc-
tive life/death binary. That bliss can be associated at once with the “one life” and with
death is not a contradiction—since bliss collapses the binary of life and death just as it
does with other binaries of the world, and since neither “life” nor “death” should be
understood here in finite terms. If Schelling compares bliss to “the state of death,”
then this is because the one absolute being in which “infinite activity” coincides with
“infinite repose,” just like in Wordsworth’s “one life,” cannot but appear as non-life
from the perspective of this finite life of division and striving. In bliss, absolute being
is at the same time absolute nothingness, and vice versa. As the unification of the
finite self with the All, it is no wonder that death comes to mark the undivision foreclosed
by the world. “No more,” writes Percy Bysshe Shelley in Adonais, a poem on the death of
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Keats, “let Life divide what Death can join together” (506). Whatever one may call this
absolute power of undivision, uniting the alienated soul with itself, with its lovers and
companions, and (at the end of Adonais) with the infinite cosmic expanse, this power
is absolutely antagonistic to finite life. Shelley’s “No more” is also a resolve and a song
(“whose might I have invoked in song” [507])—a declaration issued to and against the
world.
That the state of bliss appears from the point of view of the world as either childhood
bliss or the bliss of death, indexes the power of the world. The world seeks to re-mediate
bliss into an inaccessible past bliss and a wished-for utopia of bliss to come in an indefi-
nite future (as in Wordsworth’s “I, long before the blessed hour arrives, / Would sing in
solitude the spousal verse / Of this great consummation” [198]). Since bliss equals the end
of the world, re-mediation of bliss is how the world survives. The risk of endorsing this
re-mediation, as the Romantics sometimes do, is the risk of falling into endless approxi-
mation and theodicy. As soon as Romanticism enters into negotiations with the world
instead of saying “No more” to it, the world takes over. One could read in this way Schel-
ling’s interpretation of the Fall (Abfall): the world imposes itself negatively on the imma-
nence of bliss, enclosing, dividing, and re-mediating it. This means, however, that it is on
the power of bliss that the power of the world lives and feeds, while seeking to conceal,
defuse, and defer it. At the same time, the endless deferral of a fulfilled future has for its
flip-side the fact that nature and bliss can never be exhausted by the world. Just as the
modern world remains constitutively incomplete and not-yet, so the antagonistic
utopic space of bliss also remains, preceding and exceeding the construction of the world.
In its essence, Romanticism is not an optimism, even during those moments where it
seems to fall into theodicy. Romanticism can never fully place its faith in the world, but
only in what is antagonistic towards it. However, this leads to an impasse.10 Bliss seeks to
annihilate the world—and yet the world is there. Therein lies ultimately what appears,
from the perspective of the world in its ceaseless expansion, as the failure of Romantic
bliss. With the waning of Romanticism, bliss becomes ever more spectral, and the
clash between the spectrality of the world (declared by bliss to be unreal) and the spec-
trality of bliss (declared to be an illusion by the world) increasingly more violent, until it
is resolved into the seeming victory of the negativity of the world over bliss in Hegel or
Darwin.
Mary Shelley’s novellaMatilda, a story of an incestual love of a father for his daughter,
in whom he finds the image of her long-dead mother, and who therefore rekindles in him
again the one love of his life, brings to the surface the violence of the clash between the
world and bliss. The father’s return to Matilda, after a long disappearance from the face of
the earth, turns him into a spectral embodiment of reproduction; he is not quite of this
world anymore. At first, Matilda and her father experience the “Paradisaical bliss” of
reunion, in a Romantic oneness with nature too (22). However, as the incestual character
of his love is revealed, bliss is collapsed in a clash with the logic of reproduction. Repro-
duction here appears spectral—the father is a ghost come back to haunt the blissful figure
of the child—so that the bliss of love becomes spectral too, but their clash is no less ter-
rible because of that. In the transgressive transfer of love from mother to daughter,
Matilda implies that, ontologically, there is only one bliss and one love—but the repro-
duction of the world intervenes and tears this oneness apart, creating a spectral doubling
that turns into violence. How can the reproduction of the world not corrupt the
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Schellingian all-unity of love? There is and can be no bliss in the world’s reproductive
futurism. To accept reproduction is to accept the world and repress true love; to
attempt to affirm, in the face of the loss of love at the hands of the world, both reproduc-
tion and love—to affirm the spectral as the real—is to create terror and death. The fright-
ful ambivalence of death in Matilda serves to underscore the simultaneous clash and
entanglement between the Kantian-Darwinian (finite) and the Romantic (infinite)
logics of death. Upon Matilda’s fall from bliss, nature itself gets converted into a site
of death: the sea in which the father drowns himself, the heath where Matilda
becomes deadly ill, replace the earlier scenes of blissful nature. And yet, Matilda now
herself welcomes death in its power of undivision. “In truth,” she says, “I am in love
with death.” The shroud—“is it not my wedding dress?” (107). As Matilda’s father put
it, “futurity is dark” (10), despite the light of a better future promised by the world.
However, it is for an absolute darkness that Matilda now longs—for the infinite night
of the universe, “a universal death” (24) that coincides cosmically with the all-oneness
of love foreclosed by the world.
What the Romantic longs for at the border between bliss and the world is a power that
would be capable of overwhelming the world. In the face of the incessant global expan-
sion of the world of modernity, bliss has to become even more expansive so as to surpass
the power of the world. Hence the need, as it were, to upscale bliss, to make it planetary
and cosmic. Thus, Schelling associates bliss not only with water but also with fire, corre-
sponding respectively to the infinite passivity (all-dissolution) and infinite antagonistic
activity (all-consumption) as the two immanent attributes of bliss. As clashing with
the world of selfhood and the enclosure of being, divine oneness of bliss cannot but
appear as the all-consuming and cleansing fire of divine wrath. This fire is cosmically
identified by Schelling with the fire of the sun “sealed” within the earth’s core—a
cosmic “eternal fire” destined to erupt against the rigidity of the earth in a universal confl-
agration (Werke 12: 230). All fire is but immanently one—the atemporal Ursubstanz
itself, the one “divine fire” consuming what seeks to foreclose it towards a “transfigured,”
blissful, “purified essence” (as Clara puts it [81]).
This, too, is an expression of the immense post-Copernican power of nature. In Schel-
ling’s Naturphilosophie, the instability of the planet is embraced in its frightful power.
Ultimately, it is the universe itself, the all-encompassing A = A, that constitutes for Schel-
ling the highest blissful being. This being is precisely what Novalis longs for in Hymns to
the Night, the pinnacle of the Romantic tendency to inhabit immanently the infinite void
of the universe as blissful. The world of day, in its “busyness” and “unrest,” seeks to
“consume” the bliss of the night (14)—from which the poetic speaker, full of anxiety
(Angst) and longing (Sehnsucht), awaits deliverance. The night brings a “heavenly
freedom” (20), consuming in turn the burdens and exhaustions of the world from
which gods have already fled—perhaps to the stars. At the same time, there is a deeper
ambivalence to this longing for the universe as “our home” (20). This home is itself
infinitely alien to human life as we know it, and so it cannot be claimed by us in this
life, but only by “a new alien life” (28) at the end of the world.
Wordsworthian all-oneness of bliss also coincides at its limit with the cosmic expanse
—so that, if in Novalis’s Hymns the first movement of the poetic speaker is to turn away
from the world, to leave it below, The Prelude ends with a movement away from the earth
towards a cosmic infinity. It is from “the unwearied Heavens,” far above the “prospect of
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the world,” that Wordsworth claims to have sung “this Song,” that is, The Prelude itself as
a song of bliss (588). The infinite universe fills, as Wordsworth writes in “Star Gazers,”
“the blissful mind” that “gazes” upon it with a bliss preceding infinitely the fever and
noise of the world (“not of this noisy world, but silent and divine” [323]). Intuiting
the universal void, “all at once,” is likewise affirmed by Coleridge as infinitely blissful:
“my eye shall dart thro’ infinite expanse, / While Thought suspended lies in Rapture’s
blissful Trance” (16: 15). In an important way, then, the stars and the skies remain in
modernity the symbol of truth—it is just that it is a very modern truth: of the infinite
distance and alienness of the universe, of its indifference to the human, of gods who
have fled, leaving the human to its longing for bliss at the border between the earth
and the cosmic expanse.
The call of bliss is, in Romanticism, a cosmic call. This expresses not only the need to
upscale bliss—but the fact that bliss is already immanently infinite, so that, when the
infinite universe comes to reoccupy in modernity the infinity of God, bliss cannot but
be associated with the immeasurable cosmic void, with a primordial cosmic immanence
that precedes and exceeds the world. It has been suggested that Christianity’s response to
the Copernican revolution—this infinite dis-ordering, de-centering, and emptying-out of
the hierarchized cosmos—consisted in the last desperate attempt to imagine a paradisal
bliss “beyond” the material infinity of the universe.11 Secular modernity’s response,
meanwhile, has consisted in dreams of mastering the new planetary and cosmic
reality, converting it into order under the control of “man.” Romantic bliss opposes
both of these tendencies. Bliss is absolutely dis-orderly: there can be no ordering in
bliss. Romantic longing for bliss is not the striving to turn the universe into an
orderly, man-made garden, or to escape into an immaterial “beyond.” It is the bliss of
an immanent material inhabitation of this infinite universe as an absolute freedom
from the world, without the striving for mastery and control. Can this material void
itself be the garden? Can this alien universe already be our home? Is this perhaps the
only “truth an sich” that remains in the post-Copernican age? If so, then Romanticism
can never really fail—but is destined to keep erupting against the imposition of the world.
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Notes
1. A highly Rousseauian scene.
2. For an elaboration of these logics of modernity through a critical Blumenbergian frame-
work, see Albernaz and Chepurin. The term “self-assertion,” which I use throughout this
essay, belongs to Blumenberg.
3. To use Schelling’s and Wordsworth’s terms, respectively.
4. See Chepurin.
5. My use of the terms “common” and “undivided” to characterize Schellingian immanence is
indebted to my conversations with Joseph Albernaz. See also Albernaz.
6. Importantly, Schelling understands love as a cosmic force, so that his 1809 Freedom essay
affirms apocalyptically an all-oneness of love. This is also a (cosmic) scene of bliss.
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7. A technical clarification is perhaps in order. The striving of nature is, of course, a central
Romantic motif—but it should be grasped alongside the idea of natural bliss as refusing
all striving. Thus, in Schelling, nature’s restless striving marks its thirsting for bliss from
within the unblissful division of principles or forces that constitutes finitude. In its ceaseless
productivity, writes Schelling in 1800, nature seeks to regain, from within “absolute split
[Entzweiung],” the “absolute identity” from which it has fallen—since in its essence
nature remains “an abyss of repose [Ruhe] and inactivity” (Werke 8: 327). Nature seeks
to produce absolute identity, but is doomed to (re)produce finite, particular identities.
We may see these identities as the overabundance of natural forms, but behind it lies a con-
stitutive unblissfulness, an endless craving that cannot be sated, leading the later Schelling to
speak of the melancholy of nature. The tragic irony of all finite productivity—a highly
modern motif—is that it is driven by the desire to be free of productivity, to achieve the non-
alienation and fulfillment that are, however, foreclosed by the ontological constitution of
productivity itself. The “potencies” (that is, levels or stages) of nature form for Schelling
the structure of finitude’s approximation of bliss from within Entzweiung. Water and fire,
as states of absolute identity, are the only states in which the divided structure of natural
productivity and striving is immanently dissolved or consumed. Hence the importance of
water and fire in Schellingian (and not only Schellingian) imagery of bliss.
8. See Berlant.
9. For a key critique of the co-imbrication between modernity and “man,” see Wynter.
10. At the same time, as Rei Terada notes in her essay on Keats and the “intolerability of the
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